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Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices
Michal Feldman∗ Nick Gravin† Brendan Lucier‡
Abstract
We study anonymous posted price mechanisms for combinatorial auctions in a Bayesian
framework. In a posted price mechanism, item prices are posted, then the consumers approach
the seller sequentially in an arbitrary order, each purchasing her favorite bundle from among
the unsold items at the posted prices. These mechanisms are simple, transparent and trivially
dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC).
We show that when agent preferences are fractionally subadditive (which includes all sub-
modular functions), there always exist prices that, in expectation, obtain at least half of the
optimal welfare. Our result is constructive: given black-box access to a combinatorial auction
algorithm A, sample access to the prior distribution, and appropriate query access to the sam-
pled valuations, one can compute, in polytime, prices that guarantee at least half of the expected
welfare of A. As a corollary, we obtain the first polytime (in n and m) constant-factor DSIC
mechanism for Bayesian submodular combinatorial auctions, given access to demand query or-
acles. Our results also extend to valuations with complements, where the approximation factor
degrades linearly with the level of complementarity.
1 Introduction
The canonical problem in market design is to efficiently allocate a set of m resources among a set
of n self-interested agents. Such allocation problems range in scope from the trade of a single item
between a seller and a buyer, to combinatorial auctions in which many heterogeneous goods are to
be divided among multiple participants with complex and idiosyncratic preferences. Scenarios of
the latter type have attracted significant recent attention from the computer science community,
due to algorithmic challenges presented by the underlying allocation problem. For example, the
efficient allocation of cloud resources involves the scheduling of computing tasks, and the allocation
of wireless spectrum involves finding large independent sets in graphs that represent interference
constraints. The primary challenge in AGT is to marry algorithmic solutions to such problems
with the economic principles that underpin market design.
As an example, take the problem of designing an incentive compatible mechanism for combi-
natorial auctions with submodular bidders. The underlying optimization problem is NP-hard, and
simple greedy methods achieve a constant approximation. On the other hand, whether there is a
truthful polytime constant-factor approximation has remained a vexing and major open question
for over a decade1. One might therefore wonder whether it is even feasible to implement a combi-
natorial auction mechanism that is both computationally tractable and economically appealing.
∗Tel-Aviv University; mfeldman@tau.ac.il
†Microsoft Research; ngravin@microsoft.com
‡Microsoft Research; brlucier@microsoft.com
1For some models of valuation access, such as the value query model, it is in fact known that no sub-polynomial
worst-case approximation is possible [17].
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When designing an economically viable mechanism, it is desirable to not only respect incentives
and computational constraints, but also to resolve allocation decisions in a straightforward and
transparent fashion. For example, a simple and natural approach is to resolve a market using
posted prices. One might imagine an implementation in which items are assigned anonymous prices
(i.e., all agents face the exact same prices), then agents arrive to the market and each consumes his
most-desired bundle under the given prices. Such a methodology exhibits many desirable properties:
it is simple, decentralized, and easy to implement. It is also transparent in the sense that a buyer
does not need to understand the price-setting method in order to understand how to participate —
he simply behaves as a price-taker and consumes his preferred bundle. Therefore, it is also trivially
incentive compatible.
Posted price mechanisms are highly applicable when markets are large and the aggregate de-
mands of buyers can be accurately predicted. For instance, if the buyers’ valuations are public
knowledge and satisfy the gross substitutes condition, then there always exist prices that efficiently
clear the market [23, 29]. Similar results hold in large markets for arbitrary valuations [32]. How-
ever, if valuations are not fully known to the seller and are unpredictable, as in the submodular
combinatorial auction problem described above, then it is unclear how reasonable prices can be
set. This motivates the approach of implementing an optimization algorithm as an auction, where
buyers submit competing bids that are treated as input. As Milgrom writes, “When goods are not
standardized or when the market clearing prices are highly unstable, posted prices work poorly,
and auctions are usually preferred” [33].
We are left with a dichotomy. Posted prices form a simple and natural market instrument, but
they generate efficient outcomes only under special circumstances and full information over the
buyers’ preferences. General auctions are more widely applicable, but can be significantly more
complex to execute and participate in; moreover, we still do not have reasonable auction designs
for many allocation problems of interest. A natural question arises:
To what extent can approximately efficient outcomes be implemented using anonymous
posted prices in settings of incomplete information?
In this work we study the power of anonymous posted prices in Bayesian settings, where the
designer knows the distribution over the agents’ valuations but not their realizations. The Bayesian
setting imposes additional challenges over the full information setting typical in the market equilib-
rium literature. In particular, readers familiar with this literature will note that, in this probabilistic
setting, there do not exist prices that are guaranteed to satisfy all agent demands simultaneously.
To mitigate this problem, we consider posted price mechanisms that admit the agents sequentially,
in an arbitrary order, to select their most preferred bundle from the remaining items.
We devise polytime posted price mechanisms, for several classes of valuations, that achieve
nearly optimal social welfare given appropriate access to the distribution of the agents’ valuations.
Specifically, for XOS valuations (a strict superset of submodular valuations) we devise a mechanism
that obtains a constant fraction of the optimal social welfare. Notably, this implies that we can
obtain an O(1)-approximate dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism for Bayesian XOS
valuations, whose running time is polynomial in n and m given access to demand queries. Prior to
this work, the best-known polytime mechanisms (posted-price or otherwise) were either polyloga-
rithmic approximations [15] or had runtimes that were polynomial in the support size of an agent’s
valuation distribution, which could be exponential in n and m [4, 24]. In addition, for general
monotone valuations, we devise a mechanism that obtains an approximation factor that degrades
gracefully with the level of complementarity of the functions, as captured by the maximum-over-
hypergraph (MPH) hierarchy, recently introduced in [20]. A more detailed description of our results,
along with a comparison to the related literature, appears below.
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1.1 Our model
Our setting consists of a set M of m indivisible objects and a set of n buyers. Each buyer has a
valuation function vi(·) : 2
M → R≥0 that indicates his value for every set of objects. We assume
valuations are monotone non-decreasing, normalized so that vi(∅) = 0, and scaled to lie in [0, 1].
The profile of buyer valuations is denoted by v = (v1, . . . , vn).
An allocation of M is a vector of sets X = (X1, . . . ,Xn), where Xi denotes the bundle assigned
to buyer i, for every buyer i ∈ [n], and Xi ∩Xk = ∅ for every i 6= k (note that it is not required
that all items are allocated). The social welfare of an allocation X is SW(X) =
∑n
i=1 vi(Xi), and
the optimal welfare is denoted by OPT.
The utility of buyer i being allocated bundle Xi under prices p is ui(Xi,p) = vi(Xi)−
∑
j∈Xi
pj .
Given prices p = (p1, . . . , pm), the demand correspondence Di(M,p) of buyer i contains the sets of
objects that maximize buyer i’s utility.
We consider a Bayesian setting, where the bidders’ valuations are drawn independently from
distributions F1, . . . ,Fn. Write F = F1 × · · · × Fn, so that v is drawn from F . We think of F
as being public knowledge, whereas the realization vi is known only to agent i. In the Bayesian
framework, an allocation X is said to be an α-approximation (for social welfare) if
Ev∼F [SW(X(v))] ≥ (1/α) ·Ev∼F [OPT(v)] .
1.2 Anonymous Posted Price Mechanisms
The posted price mechanisms considered in this paper proceed in the following steps:
1. (pricing phase) a price vector p is determined, based on F ;
2. (arrival order phase) an arrival order pi is determined;
3. (value realization phase) A value vi ∼ Fi is realized for every buyer i, known only to buyer i;
4. (consumption phase) The buyers arrive to the market according to the order pi, and each
buyer receives his most desired bundle among all remaining items. That is, for every buyer
i, Xi ∈ Di(p,M \
⋃
j<pii
Xj). Buyer i pays the sum of item prices in his bundle Xi.
We refer to these as anonymous posted price mechanisms, though sometimes we will leave out
“anonymous” for brevity. We note that the mechanism can be described in two equivalent ways,
namely as an indirect or a direct mechanism. In both versions, the mechanism sets the prices and
determines2 the arrival order. The difference is that in the indirect implementation, the agents
arrive and purchase their desired items in the determined order, whereas in the direct revelation
implementation, the buyers report their valuations, and the mechanism simulates the consumption
phase on their behalf. This latter simulation requires that the mechanism have access to demand
oracles3.
It is easy to verify that any posted price mechanism that adheres to this structure is trivially
dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC). Moreover, it is clearly weakly group strategyproof,
meaning that no coalition of agents can deviate in a way that strictly benefits each one of them.
All of our results hold regardless of the order selected in the arrival order phase, so we can
think of the arrival order as being chosen adversarially. In the direct revelation implementation
2All of our results hold under arbitrary arrival orders, so one can also think of an adversary as choosing the order.
3While answering a demand query might be NP-hard in some cases, in the context of combinatorial auctions it is
natural to expect the agent to be able to answer a demand query. Otherwise it would be unreasonable to expect any
mechanism to satisfy the agents’ demands. Furthermore, in some cases there are polytime algorithms for answering
demand queries. For example, for gross substitutes valuations demand queries can be implemented with a polynomial
number of value queries [35].
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it would be natural to imbue the mechanism with the power to choose the ordering, but we view
obliviousness to the order as increasing the robustness of the mechanism.
Beyond the strong incentive characteristics of posted price mechanisms, they are appealing in
their simplicity. In particular, they proceed by setting a single price vector and using it for all
agents.
1.3 Our results
We establish welfare guarantees for XOS (i.e., fractionally subadditive) valuations (a strict superset
of submodular valuations), and for MPH-k valuations — a hierarchy that spans all monotone
valuations, parameterized by the complementarity level k. Our main contribution is the following:
Theorem: [2-approximation for XOS] Given black-box access to an algorithm A for XOS
valuations, sample access to XOS distributions F , an XOS query oracle for the valuations in
the support of F , and a demand oracle for the valuations, there exists a posted price mechanism
that, for every XOS valuation profile v, and every ε, returns an outcome that gives expected social
welfare of at least 12Ev∼F [A(v)]− ε, and runs in time POLY(n,m, 1/ε).
We note that the factor of 2 is tight (even for a single item), as established by the illustrating
example in the end of this section. We also note that the demand oracle requirement is needed only
for simulating agent behavior in the consumption phase. This theorem implies a set of results for
XOS valuations and special cases thereof, including submodular and gross substitutes valuations.
Before presenting the corollaries, we wish to emphasize the strengths of this result in light of the
previous literature:
• (Truly) polytime: Many previous mechanisms have (essentially) pseudo-polynomial run-
time, in the sense that they are polynomial in the size of the agents’ type space, which may
plausibly be exponential in m and n. The runtime of our mechanisms is polynomial in m and
n, independent of the type space sizes.
• DSIC: Many existing mechanisms for settings of incomplete information exhibit the weaker
notion of Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC). Our mechanism exhibits the stronger notion
of DSIC, and is also weakly group strategyproof.
The heart of the construction of our mechanism lies in the appropriate price assignment; this
is the part where oracle access is needed (except for the consumption phase that requires access
to demand oracles). Together with known algorithmic results, our theorem implies the following
polytime approximation results for XOS, submodular and gross substitutes valuations.
Theorem: [Computational results] We devise polytime (in n and m) DSIC mechanisms with
the following guarantees:
• XOS: A e2(e−1) -approximation, given sample access to the distribution, value and demand
oracles, and XOS query oracles.
• Submodular: A e2(e−1) -approximation, given sample access to the distribution, value oracles,
and demand oracles. Demand oracles are required only in the consumption phase.
• Gross substitutes (GS): A 12 -approximation, given only sample access to the distribution
and value oracles.
So far we have only considered complement-free valuations. Our second main result concerns
valuation functions that exhibit complementarities.
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Theorem: [k-approximation for MPH−k] Given a black-box access to an algorithm A for
MPH−k valuations, a sample access to MPH−k distributions F , an MPH−k query oracle for the
valuations in the support of F , and a demand oracle for the valuations, there exists a posted price
mechanism that, for every MPH−k valuation profile v, and every ε, returns an outcome that gives
expected social welfare of at least 1kEv∼F [A(v)] − ε, and runs in time POLY(n,m
k, 1/ε).
By the fact that the class of MPH−m valuations (i.e., k = m) is equivalent to the class of all
monotone functions, the last theorem implies the existence of posted prices that gives expected
social welfare of at least 1Ω(m) fraction of OPT. We also show that this bound is tight.
An Illustrating Example. To give some insight into our results, consider the case of a single
item and n bidders with values drawn i.i.d. from some distribution F . In this setting, the Vickrey
auction generates the efficient outcome. How well can one approximate the efficient outcome by
setting a single price p (that depends only on F and n) and allocating to a random bidder4 with
value greater than p, if any exists?
It is known that one cannot hope to achieve better than half of the optimal expected welfare [28].
For instance, suppose F is such that each agent has (large) value X with probability q = 1− (1−
1/X)1/n and value 1 otherwise. Then the probability that any agent has value X is 1/X, and hence
the expected optimal welfare is 1 · (1 − 1/X) +X · (1/X), which approaches 2 as X grows large.
On the other hand, no posted price obtains welfare greater than 1: if p > 1, it generates welfare
X with probability 1/X; whereas if p ≤ 1, an arbitrary agent will buy and the expected welfare is
1 +Xq = 1 +O( 1n). A posted price therefore cannot extract more than half of OPT.
However, there is a simple pricing scheme for a single item that yields half of the optimal social
welfare; such methods are known from the prophet inequality literature [30]. Specifically, set price
p equal to half of the expected highest value. To see why this works, write pi for the probability that
the item is sold, and write i∗ for the agent with the highest value for the item (note i∗ is a random
variable). The expected revenue from the auction is precisely p ·pi = 12E[vi∗ ] ·pi. On the other hand,
the probability that nobody buys the item ahead of buyer i∗ is at least 1−pi. The expected surplus
(value minus payments) of buyer i∗, conditioned on item being still available, is at least E[vi∗ ]−p =
1
2E[vi∗ ]. Putting this together, we have that the expected welfare of the auction, which equals the
expected revenue plus the expected buyer surplus, is at least 12E[vi∗ ] ·pi+
1
2E[vi∗ ] · (1−pi) =
1
2E[vi∗ ],
as claimed.
Our main result shows that the reasoning given in the single-item example can be extended
to markets with multiple heterogeneous items for sale and asymmetric buyers, as long as buyer
preferences lie in the class of XOS valuations.
1.4 Related work
Our work is part of the recent body of literature on simple, non-optimal mechanisms [26, 14].
The design and performance of simple mechanisms is an active field of research, motivated by
the observation that in practice, designers are often willing to trade truthfulness or optimality
for simplicity. Canonical examples include the generalized second price (GSP) auctions for online
advertising [18, 36], and the ascending price auction for electromagnetic spectrum allocation [34].
A particularly relevant example of a simple mechanism is the simultaneous item auction, in
which agents make simultaneous, separate bids on multiple items. Such auctions are not truthful,
but achieve, at equilibrium, a constant approximation to the optimal welfare when agents have
complement-free valuations [6, 13, 21, 27]. A conclusion from this is that by restricting bidders
4Since agents are iid, this is equivalent to an adversarial order that doesn’t depend on the value realizations.
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to bid only on individual items, rather than on packages as in the VCG auction, one loses only a
constant factor from the optimal welfare. Our results show that it is possible to go one step further,
in terms of simplicity. Indeed, posted price mechanisms not only handle items separately but also
forego competition entirely and simply publish prices on individual items, and simultaneously
exhibit strong incentive compatibility.
There is a long line of research studying the performance of posted price mechanisms under the
objective of maximizing revenue. When there is only a single item for sale, posted prices obtain
78% of the optimal revenue in large markets [8]. When agents have unit-demand preferences, a
form of posted-price mechanism extracts a constant fraction of the optimal revenue [10, 11, 12].
When there is only a single item for sale, this constant factor persists even when the distributions
are unknown, as long as they are MHR [3]. Notably, these works all apply a more relaxed notion
of a posted-price mechanism, in which one can set different prices for each customer. In contrast,
the mechanisms we consider use non-discriminatory pricing.
Our work relates to the design of truthful submodular combinatorial auctions. Given access
to demand queries, a randomized truthful O(logm log logm) worst-case approximation exists [15].
It is a major open question whether there is a truthful constant-factor mechanism, using demand
queries. It is known that no sub-polynomial factor is possible under the value query model [17], or
for succinctly-described valuations [16]. We show that in Bayesian settings, where the performance
of the mechanism is evaluated based on its expected social welfare given an input distribution, one
can indeed design a truthful constant-factor submodular combinatorial auction.
Ours is not the first work to turn to the Bayesian setting for combinatorial auction design.
Hartline and Lucier [25], Hartline et al. [24] and Bei and Huang [4] provide black-box reductions that
convert an arbitrary welfare-maximization algorithm into an (approximately) Bayesian incentive
compatible (BIC) mechanism, without loss of welfare. In particular, one can apply the latter two
to constant-factor approximations for submodular CAs to obtain BIC constant-factor mechanisms.
However, these mechanisms require time polynomial in the support size of an agent’s valuation
distribution, which can be exponential in n and m. In contrast, our mechanism runs in time
polynomial in n and m, regardless of the valuation distributions’ support sizes. Alaei [2] presents a
general method for designing DSIC combinatorial auction mechanisms in Bayesian settings, using
an algorithm for a related single-agent optimization problem, but does not consider submodular
CAs5.
2 Preliminaries
Valuation Classes We study both complement-free valuations, and valuations that exhibit com-
plementarities. There is a standard hierarchy of complement-free valuations (see [31]): additive ⊂
gross substitutes ⊂ submodular ⊂ XOS ⊂ subadditive.
additive v(S) =
∑
j∈S v({j}) for all S ⊂M .
submodular for every S ⊆ T ⊆M and j ∈M , v(j|T ) ≤ v(j|S), where v(j|S) := v(S∪{j})−v(S).
XOS there exists a collection of additive functions A1(·), . . . , Ak(·) such that for every set S ⊆M ,
v(S) = max1≤i≤k Ai(S).
5While Alaei [2] does not explicitly discuss submodular CAs, our understanding is that one could use his method-
ology together with an algorithm for (single-agent) submodular function maximization to construct a constant-factor
DSIC mechanism for the submodular CA problem. We note that such a mechanism would not fall within the
posted-price paradigm.
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subadditive for any subsets S1, S2 ⊂M , v(S1) + v(S2) ≥ v(S1 ∪ S2).
To study valuations with complements, we consider the hierarchy maximum over positive hy-
pergraphs (MPH), introduced recently by [20]. This hierarchy is general enough to encapsulate
all monotone valuation functions, and its level captures the degree of complementarity. We defer a
formal description to Section 4.
Computational model An algorithm for the combinatorial auction problem receives as input a
valuation profile v, and returns an allocation profile. We write A for an algorithm, and A(v) for
the allocation returned. As any explicit description of vi : 2
M → R≥0 would have size exponential
in m, it is usually assumed that there is an oracle access to vi. We consider the following oracles:
• Value oracle takes as input a set T , and returns vi(T );
• Demand oracle takes as an input a price vector p, and returns a set from demand corre-
spondence Di(M,p), breaking ties arbitrarily but consistently;
• XOS oracle (only for XOS function vi) takes as input a set T , and returns the corresponding
additive representative function for the set T , i.e., an additive function Ai(·) such that (i)
vi(S) ≥ Ai(S) for any S ⊂ [m], and (ii) vi(T ) = Ai(T );
While value oracle is the least computationally demanding for the buyers and the seller, the
demand oracle captures the most basic decision problem a buyer faces in a market with item prices.
Since the primary focus of this paper is on the pricing mechanisms, we assume throughout the paper
an access to demand and value oracles for granted. We note that XOS oracles are less commonly
used in the literature. However, for some classes of valuations XOS oracle can be implemented via
polynomially many queries to value oracle, e.g., for any submodular function.
3 Posted Prices for XOS Valuations
The main theorem in this section is the following.
Theorem 3.1. Let distribution F over XOS valuation profiles be given via a sample access to F .
Suppose that for every v ∼ F we have
1. black-box access to a welfare maximization algorithm A for combinatorial auctions,
2. an XOS query oracle (for valuations sampled from F).
Then, for any ε > 0, we can compute item prices in POLY(m,n, 1/ε) time such that, for any buyer
arrival order, the expected welfare of the posted price mechanism is at least 12Ev∼F [SW(A(v))]− ε.
Implications. Before proving Theorem 3.1, let us discuss some implications. First, note that
using an α-approximation algorithm for A in Theorem 3.1 results in a posted price mechanism
with approximation factor α/2, minus an additive error term that can be made as small as desired.
Recall that implementing the consumption phase in a direct revelation mechanism does require
access to demand queries; note that Theorem 3.1 and its corollaries below refer specifically to the
pricing phase.
If we assume access to demand oracles, then we can use the polytime algorithm of Feige [19]
with approximation factor 1−1/e as a black box. Theorem 3.1 then implies the existence of a DSIC
mechanism with expected social welfare at least e2(e−1)OPT− ε and runtime POLY(m,n, 1/ε).
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For submodular valuations, one could instead use the algorithm by Vondrak [37] with tight
approximation factor α = 1 − 1/e that utilizes only value queries. Since XOS queries can be
simulated by value queries for submodular valuations [9], we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 3.2. Given sample access to submodular distributions F and value oracle access to each
valuation in the support of F , for every ε > 0, one can compute item prices in time POLY(m,n, 1/ε),
such that, for any buyer arrival order, the expected welfare of the posted price mechanism is at least
e
2(e−1)Ev∼F [SW(A(v))] − ε.
As before, one can implement the mechanism from Corollary 3.2 as a direct revelation mecha-
nism, if one also has access to demand oracles for the valuations.
For gross substitutes valuations, demand queries can be implemented with a polynomial number
of value queries [35], and an optimal allocation can be computed in polynomial time using demand
queries [7]. The following corollary follows:
Corollary 3.3. Given sample access to gross substitutes distributions F and value oracle access
to each valuation in the support of F , for every ε > 0, one can compute item prices in time
POLY(m,n, 1/ε), such that, for any buyer arrival order, the expected welfare of the posted price
mechanism is at least 12Ev∼F [SW(A(v))] − ε.
Here, the mechanism from Corollary 3.2 can be implemented as a direct revelation mechanism,
using only value queries.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. We now proceed with the proof of Theorem 3.1. The proof will proceed
in two parts. We begin with Lemma 3.4, which establishes the existence of prices that achieve the
desired welfare properties, without regard for computation. In fact, Lemma 3.4 will also establish
something stronger: if the prices are perturbed slightly, this does not have too large an effect on
expected welfare. We will then use this stronger property to show how the prices can be computed
efficiently via sampling. This sampling process generates the additional additive error term in
Theorem 3.1.
Before delving into the details of the proof, we need the following definition of an item’s welfare
contribution. Fix a valuation profile v = (v1, . . . , vn) and algorithm A, and let X = (X1, . . . ,Xn)
be the allocation A(v). For each XOS valuation function vi(·), define the corresponding additive
representative function for the set Xi as the function Ai(·) satisfying: (i) vi(S) ≥ Ai(S) for any
S ⊂ [m], and (ii) vi(Xi) = Ai(Xi). For every item j ∈ Xi we define SWj(v) := Ai({j}). We think
of SWj(v) as the contribution of item j to the social welfare under valuation profile v.
Lemma 3.4. Given a distribution F over XOS valuations, let p be the price vector defined as
pj =
1
2
· E
v∼F
[
SWj(v)
]
.
Let p′ be any price vector such that |p′j−pj | < δ for all j. Then, for any arrival order pi, consumption
under prices p′ results in expected welfare at least 12Ev∼F [SW(A(v))] −mδ.
Proof. First, by the definition of pj,
p′j = E
v∼F
[
SWj(v) − p
′
j
]
+ 2(p′j − pj) (1)
=
n∑
i=1
E
v∼F
[(
SWj(v)− p
′
j
)
· 1
[
j ∈ Xi(v)
] ]
+ 2(p′j − pj).
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We are now going to estimate the sum of buyers’ utilities in expectation over F . Fix i and
v = (vi,v-i). Let SOLDi(v, pi) denote the set of items that have been sold before the arrival of buyer
i. Recall that buyer i picks an allocation6 that maximizes his utility with respect to his valuation
vi and prices p, from among the items in M \ SOLDi(v, pi).
Consider another random valuation profile v˜-i ∼ F-i which is independent of v. Let Xi(vi, v˜-i)
be the allocation returned by A on input (vi, v˜-i). We consider additive representative function Ai
for the set Xi(vi, v˜-i), so that Ai({j}) = SWj(vi, v˜-i) for each j ∈ Xi(vi, v˜-i). Let Si(vi,v-i, v˜-i) :=
Xi(vi, v˜-i)\SOLDi(v, pi) be the subset of items in Xi(vi, v˜-i) that are available to be purchased when
buyer i arrives. We note that buyer i could have picked the set Si(vi,v-i, v˜-i) and, therefore, his
utility must be at least the utility he would get from purchasing that set. Thus we have
ui(v) ≥ E
v˜-i
 ∑
j∈Si(vi,v-i,v˜-i)
max
(
SWj(vi, v˜-i)− p
′
j, 0
)  .
Adding these inequalities for all buyers and taking the expectation over all v ∼ F we get
E
v∼F
[
n∑
i=1
ui(v)
]
≥
∑
j∈M
n∑
i=1
E
vi,v-i,
v˜-i
[
1
[
j ∈ Xi(vi, v˜-i)
]
·max
(
SWj(vi, v˜-i)− p
′
j , 0
)
· 1
[
j /∈ SOLDi(v, pi)
]]
.
(2)
We further observe that SOLDi(v, pi) does not depend on vi. That is, SOLDi(v, pi) = SOLDi(v-i, pi).
Therefore, we can rewrite (2) as follows:
E
v∼F
[
n∑
i=1
ui(v)
]
≥
∑
j∈M
n∑
i=1
Pr
v
[
j /∈ SOLDi(v, pi)
]
· E
vi,v˜-i
[
max
(
SWj(vi, v˜-i)− p
′
j , 0
)
· 1
[
j ∈ Xi(vi, v˜-i)
] ]
≥
∑
j∈M
n∑
i=1
Pr
v
[
j /∈ SOLD(v, pi)
]
· E
vi,v˜-i
[
max
(
SWj(vi, v˜-i)− p
′
j, 0
)
· 1
[
j ∈ Xi(vi, v˜-i)
] ]
≥
∑
j∈M
Pr
v
[
j /∈ SOLD(v, pi)
]
·
(
n∑
i=1
E
v
[(
SWj(v)− p
′
j
)
· 1
[
j ∈ Xi(v)
] ])
=
∑
j∈M
Pr
v
[
j /∈ SOLD(v, pi)
]
· (pj + (pj − p
′
j)). (3)
In the second inequality, we decreased each probability Pr[j /∈ SOLDi(v, pi)] to Pr[j /∈ SOLD(v, pi)];
the inequality holds as all the terms in the summation are non negative. In the third inequality
we decreased the random variables under expectations and substituted every variable (vi, v˜-i) to v.
The last equality follows from (1). Inequality (3) is our desired bound on the sum of buyer utilities.
We now turn to the expected revenue, which is
E
v∼F
[
Rev(v, pi)
]
=
∑
j∈M
Pr
v
[
j ∈ SOLD(v, pi)
]
· (pj − (pj − p
′
j)). (4)
6Note that if a buyer has more than one bundle in his demand correspondence, then we assume that ties can be
broken arbitrarily – even adversarially.
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Therefore, adding (3) and (4) we derive the following bound on the expected social welfare:
E
v∼F
[
n∑
i=1
ui(v)
]
+ E
v∼F
[
Rev(v, pi)
]
≥
∑
j∈M
pj +
∑
j∈M
(pj − p
′
j)
(
1− 2Pr
v
[
j ∈ SOLD(v, pi)
])
≥
1
2
E
v∼F
[
n∑
i=1
vi(Xi)
]
−
∑
j∈M
|pj − p
′
j|
≥
1
2
E
v∼F
[
n∑
i=1
vi(Xi)
]
−mδ
as required.
With Lemma 3.4 at hand, we are ready to complete the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Proof Sketch. (of Theorem 3.1) It remains to show how to compute an appropriate choice of prices
p′ satisfying the conditions of Lemma 3.4. Our approach will be to estimate pj =
1
2 · E
v∼F
[SWj(v)]
by repeatedly sampling a valuation profile vˆ ∼ F and computing 12SWj(vˆ). Since
1
2SWj(vˆ) is
a random variable lying in [0, 1], standard concentration bounds imply that we can accurately
estimate its expectation in a relatively small number t of samples. In Appendix A we work out the
appropriate bounds and show that t = (logm+log n− log ε)4m2/ε2 samples per item are sufficient
to satisfy the conditions of Theorem 3.1.
Algorithm 1 - Price computation algorithm, paramaterized by positive integer t.
1: For each item j ∈M :
2: Repeat t times:
3: Draw v ∼ F and let X = A(v).
4: Let i be the agent for which j ∈ Xi.
5: Query the XOS oracle for vi to find SWj(v).
6: Let p′j be half of the average value of SWj(v) seen over all t iterations.
7: return p′
We can therefore take p′j to be the empirical estimate after this number of samples, satisfying
the conditions of the theorem. To summarize, this procedure for computing p′ is listed formally as
Algorithm 1.
4 Posted Prices for General Valuations
A result similar to Theorem 3.1 holds for the more general class of MPH-k valuations, where we
get O(k)-approximate DSIC mechanisms for functions with complementarity level k. We will begin
by formally defining the maximum over positive hypergraphs (MPH) hierarchy and providing other
preliminaries. We will then provide a formal result statement.
4.1 Preliminaries and Definitions.
To explain maximum over positive hypergraphs (MPH) hierarchy, we first need a few preliminaries.
A hypergraph representation h of valuation function v : 2M → R+ is a set function that satisfies
v(S) =
∑
T⊆S h(T ). It is easy to verify that any valuation function v admits a unique hypergraph
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representation and vice versa. A set S such that h(S) 6= 0 is said to be a hyperedge of h. The
hypergraph representation can be thought as a weighted hypergraph, where every vertex is associ-
ated with an item in M , and the weight of each hyperedge e ⊆ M is h(e). Then the value of the
function for any set S ⊆M is the total value of all hyperedges that are contained in S.
The rank of a hypergraph representation h is the cardinality k of the largest hyperedge. The
rank of v is the rank of its corresponding h and we refer to a valuation function v with rank k as a
hypergraph-k valuation. If the hypergraph representation of v is non-negative, i.e. for any S ⊆M ,
h(S) ≥ 0, then we refer to function v as a positive hypergraph-k function (PH-k) [1]. We are now
ready to present the class of MPH-k valuations.
Definition 4.1 (MPH-k valuation). A monotone valuation function v : 2M → R+ is Maximum
over Positive Hypergraph-k (MPH-k) if it can be expressed as a maximum over a set of PH-k
functions. That is, there exist PH-k functions {vℓ}ℓ∈L such that for every set S ⊆M ,
v(S) = maxℓ∈L vℓ(S), (5)
where L is an arbitrary index set.
It can be easily verified that the highest level of the hierarchy, MPH-m captures all monotone
functions, and the lowest level, MPH-1, captures all XOS functions.
Finally, we define what is meant by an MPH-k oracle, which is an extension of XOS oracles to
higher levels of theMPH hierarchy. Suppose that valuation function v is MPH-k , with supporting
PH-k functions {vℓ}ℓ∈L. An MPH-k -oracle for v takes as input a set of items S, and returns the
PH-k function vℓ for which v(S) = vℓ(S). We will assume that this function vℓ is returned in its
explicit hypergraph representation, i.e. as a list of weighted hyperedges. Note that the size of this
representation depends on the number of hyperedges required to express the PH-k functions vℓ,
and is at most O(mk). On a side note, it is this bound that leads to a runtime that is polynomial
in mk in Theorem 4.1. Note that if we restricted attention to MPH-k valuations whose supporting
PH-k functions each have at most r hyperedges, then this runtime dependency would change from
mk to r.
4.2 Pricing for MPH-k valuations.
Our result is cast in the following theorem, whose proof is deferred to Appendix B.7
Theorem 4.1. Suppose our Bayesian instance F over MPH valuations is given via a sample
access to F . Suppose that for every v ∼ F we have
1. black-box access to a welfare maximization algorithm A for combinatorial auctions,
2. an MPH query oracle for the valuations in the support of F .
Then, for every ε > 0, one can compute item prices in time8 POLY(mk, n, 1/ε) that generate
expected welfare of at least 14kEv∼F [SW(A(v))] − ε for any buyers’ arrival order.
7The proof of Theorem 4.1 follows Theorem 3.1, but with an important difference: the accounting of the contri-
bution of an item j to the welfare is more complex, since one must consider all hyperedges in which j appears. This
complicates the choice of prices, as well as the derivation of welfare bounds.
8The exponential dependence on k in the runtime is related to the representation ofMPH valuations. In particular,
the output of an MPH-k oracle can be of size O(mk). One could reduce this bound by imposing constraints on the
complexity of a valuation’s MPH representation. This is discussed further in Appendix B.
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We also show that this result is essentially tight. Indeed, for each level k of complementarities
across the items in the MPH-k hierarchy, we may consider single minded (of size k) and unit-
demand valuations. It turns out that item prices may result in an outcome with a linear (in the
number of items) loss in social welfare. The example is deferred to Appendix C.
5 Discussion and Open Problems
We conclude with a few remarks.
First, in our mechanisms, we consider an arbitrary order of arrivals, which may be chosen by
an adversary after the prices are posted, but before the adversary observes the realization of the
buyer valuations. It is not difficult to verify that the same results extend to an adaptive adversary,
who chooses the arrival order sequentially; i.e., an adversary who observes which items have been
purchased by previous buyers and even the realization of previous buyers’ valuations, and chooses
the next buyer to arrive based on this information. Our proof techniques (in Theorems 3.1 and
4.1) apply to this adaptive adversary as well.
Second, readers who are familiar with literature on Walrasian equilibrium will realize the simi-
larities between the two models, but also the stark contrast. The main difference is whether agents
arrive to the market sequentially (as in our model), or simultaneously (as in a Walrasian equilib-
rium). Recent results [22] have shown that in the simultaneous model (even when some items may
remain unsold), there may be a linear loss in welfare for XOS buyers, even in a full information
setting. Thus our work demonstrates a strong gap in welfare between simultaneous and sequential
arrivals, when restricted to individual demand satisfaction.
Our model and results leave a number of directions for future research. First, the constant
approximation for XOS valuations implies (by known results, see e.g. [5]) a logarithmic approxima-
tion for subadditive valuations. It remains open whether a constant approximation for subadditive
valuations can be achieved.
In this work we focused on a setting in which the buyer arrival order is adversarial, but one
might consider relaxing this worst-case setting. For example: does the approximability of the
problem substantially improve if the buyers arrive in a uniformly random order? What if the
mechanism can select the order, subject to incentive compatibility constraints? Alternatively, one
might ask whether a constant approximation is still possible if the adversary is more powerful, and
can observe all valuation realizations before selecting the arrival order. Also, rather than looking
at an exogenously-imposed arrival order, one might imagine bidders strategically choosing their
arrival times, with early positions in queue being costly to secure.
Finally, throughout the paper we assume that items are indivisible and heterogeneous. It would
be interesting to partially relax these assumptions. For example, one could assume that every item
in the market has a few identical copies and that every buyer wants at most a single copy of each
item. It would be interesting to analyze the efficiency of posted price mechanisms as a function of
the minimal number of item copies. Given the negative results for valuations with high degree of
complementarity, it would be particularly interesting to find relaxations that admit positive results,
say for single-minded buyers.
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APPENDIX
A Details of the proof of Theorem 3.1
We now present the details omitted from the proof of Theorem 3.1.
We wish to show how to compute an appropriate choice of prices p′ satisfying the conditions
of Lemma 3.4. Our approach will be to estimate pj =
1
2 · E
v∼F
[SWj(v)] by repeatedly sampling a
valuation profile vˆ ∼ F and computing 12SWj(vˆ). Since
1
2SWj(vˆ) is a random variable lying in
[0, 1], standard concentration bounds imply that we can accurately estimate its expectation in a
relatively small number t of samples. We can therefore take p′j to be the empirical estimate after
this number of samples, satisfying the conditions of the theorem. This procedure is listed formally
as Algorithm 1 in Section 3.
We wish to choose t large enough that, with probability at least 1−ε/n, we will have |p′j−pj| <
ε/2m for all j. Fix any j and note that p′j is the average of t identical samples from a distribution
supported on [0, 1], with expected value pj. Thus, by the Hoeffding bound, we have that
Pr[|p′j − pj| > ε/2m] < 2e
−t(ε/2m)2 .
We can therefore choose t = (logm + log n − log ε)4m2/ε2 to get Pr[|p′j − pj| > ε/2m] < ε/mn.
Applying a union bound over all j ∈ M , we have that |p′j − pj| < ε/2m for all j with probability
at least 1− ε/n, as desired.
Setting δ = ε/2m in Lemma 3.4, we have that our computed prices generate welfare at least
1
2Ev∼F [SW(A(v))]− ε/2, with probability at least 1− ε/n. We conclude that our computed prices
generate an expected welfare of at least(
1
2
Ev∼F [SW(A(v))] −
ε
2
)(
1−
ε
n
)
>
1
2
Ev∼F [SW(A(v))] − ε,
as required. The last inequality follows since Ev∼F [SW(A(v))] ≤ Ev∼F [
∑n
i=1 vi(M)] ≤ n.
B Proof of Theorem 4.1: MPH valuations
We closely follow the proof of Theorem 3.1 for XOS buyers. However, there is an extra difficulty
for MPH-k valuations, since the concept of the “contribution of an item to welfare” is not as
straightforward as for XOS valuations. Our main new challenge will be to appropriately account
for the contributions of different items.
We first describe an ideal price vector p which we would like to use for the distribution F .
For each fixed valuation profile v = (v1, . . . , vn) we consider allocation X(v) = (X1(v), . . . ,Xn(v))
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returned by black-box algorithm A. For each MPH-k valuation function vi(·) we take the respective
hypergraph representative function Ai(·) for the set Xi(v), i.e., vi(S) ≥ Ai(S) for any S ⊂ [m] and
vi(Xi(v)) = Ai(Xi(v)). Write wi(·) for the hypergraph weights corresponding to the hypergraph
function Ai(·); then, by definition, Ai(S) =
∑
T⊆S wi(T ) for all S ⊆ Xi(v).
For every v, every buyer i, and each item j ∈ Xi(v), we define
pj(v) =
1
α
∑
T∋j
T⊆Xi(v)
wi(T )
|T |
,
where α is a constant to be determined later. The price vector p(v) has a natural interpretation:
for each hyperedge in the hypergraph function Ai(Xi(v)), divide its weight uniformly among the
items in that edge; the price of item j is then the total weight allocated to item j, scaled down by
factor α. The price pj(v) for item j is the ideal price we would like to set in the full-information
setting, if we knew the valuation profile v.
We can now define an ideal price of item j in the Bayesian setting, which will be
pj = E
v∼F
[
pj(v)
]
.
The following Lemma relates the full-information prices for a subset of items to the marginal
impact on a buyer’s value if those items are removed from an allocation.
Lemma B.1. For any v, any buyer i, and any Q ⊆ Xi(v),
vi(Xi(v)\Q) + αk ·
∑
j∈Q
pj(v) ≥ vi(Xi(v)).
Proof.
vi(Xi(v)\Q) + αk ·
∑
j∈Q
pj(v) =
∑
T⊆Xi(v)\Q
wi(T ) + αk ·
∑
j∈Q
1
α
·
∑
T∋j
T⊆Xi(v)
wi(T )
|T |
≥
∑
T⊆Xi(v)\Q
wi(T ) +
∑
j∈Q
∑
T∋j
T⊆Xi(v)
wi(T )
≥
∑
T⊆Xi(v)\Q
wi(T ) +
∑
T⊆Xi(v)
T∩Q 6=∅
wi(T )
=
∑
T⊆Xi(v)
wi(T )
= vi(Xi(v))
where the first inequality follows because wi(T ) > 0 only for T with |T | ≤ k, and the second
inequality follows by noting that each hyperedge T counted in the second summation must have a
non-empty intersection with Q and is counted |T ∩Q| ≥ 1 times.
The next Lemma estimates the expected social welfare of a mechanism with posted prices that
are close to the ideal p.
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Lemma B.2. Let p′ be such that |p′j − pj | < δ for all j. Then consumption under prices p
′ results
in expected welfare of at least 14kEv∼F [SW(A(v))] − 2mδ.
Proof. Given the prices p′, let pi be the (adversarial) order of arrival. We are going to bound
the sum of buyers’ utilities in expectation over F . To do so, for each fixed i and v = (vi,v-i),
we consider another random valuation profile v˜-i ∼ F-i, drawn independently of v. Consider also
Xi(vi, v˜-i), the allocation returned by A on the valuation profile (vi, v˜-i). Let Si(vi,v-i, v˜-i) :=
Xi(vi, v˜-i) ∩ SOLDi(v, pi) be the subset of items in Xi(vi, v˜-i) that are already sold when buyer i is
selected to make a purchase. Let Ri(vi,v-i, v˜-i) := Xi(vi, v˜-i) \ SOLDi(v, pi) be the subset of items
in Xi(vi, v˜-i) that remain unsold at this time. We note that buyer i could have picked the set
Ri(vi,v-i, v˜-i) and, therefore, his utility is at least the utility he would get from this set. Thus we
have
ui(v) ≥ E
v˜-i
vi(Ri(vi,v-i, v˜-i))− ∑
j∈Ri(vi,v-i,v˜-i)
p′j

≥ E
v˜-i
vi(Ri(vi,v-i, v˜-i))− ∑
j∈Xi(vi,v˜-i)
p′j
 .
Applying Lemma B.1 to valuation profile (vi, v˜-i) and set Q = SOLDi(v, pi), we conclude
ui(v) ≥ E
v˜-i
α · k · ∑
j∈Si(vi,v-i,v˜-i)
pj(vi, v˜-i)−
∑
j∈Xi(vi,v˜-i)
p′j
 .
We now sum over all i and take an expectation over v ∼ F to conclude that
E
v
[∑
i
ui(v)
]
≥
∑
i
E
v,v˜-i
vi(Xi(vi, v˜-i))− ∑
j∈Xi(vi,v˜-i)
p′j

− αk ·
∑
i
E
v,v˜-i
 ∑
j∈Si(vi,v-i,v˜-i)
pj(vi, v˜-i)
 . (6)
Let us analyze separately the two summations on the RHS of (6). For the first summation, note
that v-i does not appear in the expression within the expectation. Thus, by applying a change of
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variables and then using linearity of expectation, we have
∑
i
E
v,v˜-i
vi(Xi(vi, v˜-i))− ∑
j∈Xi(vi,v˜-i)
p′j
 =∑
i
E
v
vi(Xi(v)) − ∑
j∈Xi(v)
p′j

= E
v
[∑
i
vi(Xi(v))
]
−
∑
j
p′j
≥ E
v
[∑
i
vi(Xi(v))
]
−
∑
j
pj − δm
= E
v
[∑
i
vi(Xi(v))
]
−
1
α
·
∑
j
E
v
∑
i
∑
T∋j
T⊆Xi(v)
wi(T )
|T |
− δm
= E
v
[∑
i
vi(Xi(v))
]
−
1
α
·E
v
[∑
i
vi(Xi(v))
]
− δm
=
(
1−
1
α
)
E
v
[∑
i
vi(Xi(v))
]
− δm. (7)
Note that the inequality follows from the fact that |pj − p
′
j| < δ for each item j.
For the second summation on the RHS of (6), we first recall that sets SOLDi and Si(vi,v-i, v˜-i)
are defined for the prices p′. Further note that since v-i and v˜-i are drawn independently, we have
∑
i
E
v,v˜-i
 ∑
j∈Si(v,v˜-i)
pj(vi, v˜-i)
 =∑
i
E
v,v˜-i
∑
j
pj(vi, v˜-i) · 1
[
j ∈ SOLDi(v-i, pi)
]
· 1
[
j ∈ Xi(vi, v˜-i)
]
=
∑
i,j
E
vi,v˜-i
[
1
[
j ∈ Xi(vi, v˜-i)
]
· pj(vi, v˜-i)
]
·Pr
v-i
[
j ∈ SOLDi(v-i, pi)
]
≤
∑
i,j
E
vi,v˜-i
[
1
[
j ∈ Xi(vi, v˜-i)
]
· pj(vi, v˜-i)
]
·Pr
v
[
j ∈ SOLD(v, pi)
]
=
∑
j
Pr
v
[
j ∈ SOLD(v, pi)
]
·
∑
i
E
vi,v˜-i
[
1
[
j ∈ Xi(vi, v˜-i)
]
· pj(vi, v˜-i)
]
=
∑
j
Pr
v
[
j ∈ SOLD(v, pi)
]
· pj
≤
∑
j
Pr
v
[
j ∈ SOLD(v, pi)
]
· p′j + δm
= E
v∼F
[
Rev(v, pi)
]
+ δm. (8)
The first inequality follows because the probability that j is sold before agent i arrives is dominated
by the probability that j is sold at all, and the second inequality follows from the fact that |pj−p
′
j| <
δ for each item j.
Substituting (7) and (8) into (6), we have
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E
v
[∑
i
ui(v)
]
≥
(
1−
1
α
)
E
v
[∑
i
vi(Xi(v))
]
− δm− αk · E
v∼F
[
Rev(v, pi)
]
− αkδm. (9)
As long as αk ≥ 1, we can rearrange and conclude
αk
(
E
v∼F
[
n∑
i=1
ui(v)
]
+ E
v∼F
[
Rev(v, pi)
])
≥
(
1−
1
α
)
E
v∼F
[
n∑
i=1
vi(Xi)
]
− 2αkδm.
Taking α = 2, we conclude that the expected welfare of the Posted Pricing Mechanism is within a
factor 4k of the expected welfare of A and small additive error of 2mδ, as required.
We continue with the proof of Theorem 4.1. Following the same analysis as in Theorem 3.1 for
each item j we can estimate the price p′j by sampling t = (logm+ log n− log ε)16m
2/ε2 valuation
profiles, so that Pr[|p′j − pj| > ε/4m] < ε/mn. We compute pj
′ for each sample (using algorithm A
and the MPH-k query oracle) and take the average of all prices seen. Applying a union bound over
all j ∈ M we obtain a guarantee that |p′j − pj| < ε/4m for all j with probability at least 1− ε/n.
Now, by setting δ = ε/4m in Lemma B.2 we have our computed prices p′ to generate welfare of at
least 14kEv∼F [SW(A(v))] −
ε
2 with probability at least 1− ε/n.
Finally, we conclude that generated expected welfare is at least(
1
4k
Ev∼F [SW(A(v))] −
ε
2
)(
1−
ε
n
)
>
1
4k
Ev∼F [SW(A(v))] − ε,
as required. The last inequality follows, since Ev∼F [SW(A(v))] ≤ Ev∼F [
∑n
i=1 vi(M)] ≤ n.
C Lower bound for MPH
Example. Suppose there are m identical items in the market and two buyers. Let the first buyer
have unit-demand valuation 1 per item and the second single-minded buyer have value m − 1 for
the set of all m items and 0 value for any smaller subset. The optimal social welfare OPT is m− 1,
where the second buyer is allocated all m items.
Let the seller fix prices on the items. We let the first buyer arrive first. He will buy the cheapest
item, if its price is below 1. Then the second buyer has 0 value for the remaining items, which
results in a social welfare of 1. In the case where each item costs at least 1, the first buyer purchases
nothing but so does the second buyer, as he derives value m − 1 from the entire set, for a total
cost of at least m. Therefore, the social welfare in the latter case is 0. We conclude that the social
welfare does not exceed 1 in either of the cases, which gives us the claimed linear gap of m−1 with
respect to the optimal social welfare.
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